Lessons Not Learned: II

As I noted last time, projects often take longer — and cost more — to complete than their planners initially projected. This phenomenon is accounted for, in part, by a cognitive bias known as the planning fallacy. [Kahneman & Tversky 1977] [Kahneman & Tversky 1979]. This cognitive bias operates by causing planners to rely too much on data about the project at hand, which Kahneman and Tversky call singular data. Likewise, planners tend to pay too little attention to data about past similar projects, which Kahneman and Tversky call distributional data.

In the decades since Kahneman's and Tversky's work on the planning fallacy, they and other researchers have discovered many more cognitive biases, some of which could act so as to exacerbate the effects of the planning fallacy. I explored two of these last time — the Fundamental Attribution Error and Choice-Supportive Bias.

Three more cognitive biases also come to mind in this connection: Confirmation Bias, the Overconfidence Effect, and Optimism Bias. In what follows I provide insights as to how these three cognitive biases could affect planners who are conducting a retrospective investigation of the performance of the project teams that executed projects in the not-too-distant past of their own organization.

Confirmation Bias

Confirmation bias is a cognitive bias that causes us to seek information that confirms our preconceptions, and avoid information that might disconfirm them. [Nickerson 1998] It can also cause us to tend to overvalue information supporting our preconceptions, and undervalue information in conflict with them. And confirmation bias can even affect memory, causing us to remember more clearly incidents and situations that align well with our preconceptions, and to fail to recall — or recall incorrectly — incidents and situations at odds with our preconceptions.

Confirmation bias can distort the planning process by biasing the set of past projects that planners consider, and by biasing interpretations of past results. For example, suppose a planning team adheres to the "greatest-breadth-of-experience theory" of project performance — the idea that the project team does best when it has the greatest breadth of experience in project management. That planning team is more likely than most planning teams to devise a plan that incorporates their preconception by seeking examples that support the greatest-breadth-of-experience theory of project performance. That planning team is less likely than most to be persuaded by disconfirming evidence from project management research. [Salvador, et al., 2021]

Overconfidence Effect

The Overconfidence Effect is a cognitive bias that causes us to have confidence in the validity of our judgments at a level beyond what their accuracy could reliably support. [Brenner 2015.4] [Moore & Healy 2008] The effect is more pronounced when confidence is high.

For project planners, the overconfidence effect can manifest itself in any part of a project plan that's sensitive to the judgment of planners. For example, in risk planning, judgment plays a role in estimating the probability of a given risk event occurring. Specifically, a planning team affected by the Overconfidence Effect might decide that a risk is so unlikely to materialize that they'll decide against investing in mitigation activities that an unaffected planning team might attend to more carefully.

Optimism Bias

Optimism bias is a cognitive bias that causes us to underestimate the probability of an undesirable event, or to overestimate the probability of a desirable event.

This bias can affect project planners in two ways. When assessing risk, the bias could lead to underestimates of the probabilities of unwelcome events. And when judging the relative wisdom of two options, say A compared to B, planners who are attracted to A for any reason are more likely than others to assess option A as more likely than option B.

Last words

In this post and the previous one, I assumed that those devising the plans actually wanted the project to come to a successful conclusion. And in most cases, success would entail meeting budget and schedule expectations. But there are situations in which some people — rivals, political enemies, or ambitious challengers — seek to make projects fail. In these cases, those seeking failure can exploit these cognitive biases to incline plans toward failure. Proposals and arguments consistent with the biases noted above can be an early sign of actions by these political actors.   First issue in this series   Top    Next Issue

Occasionally we have the experience of belonging to a great team. Thrilling as it is, the experience is rare. In part, it's rare because we usually strive only for adequacy, not for greatness. We do this because we don't fully appreciate the returns on greatness. Not only does it feel good to be part of great team — it pays off. Check out my Great Teams Workshop to lead your team onto the path toward greatness. More info

Footnotes

Your comments are welcome

About Point Lookout

Thank you for reading this article. I hope you enjoyed it and found it useful, and that you'll consider recommending it to a friend.

This article in its entirety was written by a human being. No machine intelligence was involved in any way.

Point Lookout is a free weekly email newsletter. Browse the archive of past issues. Subscribe for free.

Support Point Lookout by joining the Friends of Point Lookout, as an individual or as an organization.

Do you face a complex interpersonal situation? Send it in, anonymously if you like, and I'll give you my two cents.

Related articles

More articles on Project Management:

How to Make Good Guesses: Strategy

Making good guesses — guessing right — is often regarded as a talent that cannot be taught. Like most things, it probably does take talent to be among the first rank of those who make conjectures. But being in the second rank is pretty good, too, and we can learn how to do that.

Projects as Proxy Targets: II

Most projects have both supporters and detractors. When a project has been approved and execution begins, some detractors don't give up. Here's Part II of a catalog of tactics detractors use to sow chaos.

Ten Approaches to Managing Project Risks: III

Project risk management strategies are numerous, but these ten strategies are among the most common. Here are the last three of the ten strategies in this little catalog.

How We Waste Time: I

Time is the one workplace resource that's evenly distributed. Everyone gets exactly the same share, but some use it more wisely than others. Here's Part I of a little catalog of ways we waste time.

Planning Disappointments

When we plan projects, we make estimates of total costs and expected delivery dates. Often these estimates are so wrong — in the wrong direction — that we might as well be planning disappointments. Why is this?

See also Project Management and Project Management for more related articles.

Forthcoming issues of Point Lookout

Coming May 14: Working with the Overconfident

A cognitive bias known as the Overconfidence Effect causes us to overestimate the reliability of our judgments. Decisions we make based on those judgments are therefore suspect. But there are steps we can take to make our confidence levels more realistic, and thus make our decisions more reliable. Available here and by RSS on May 14.

And on May 21: Mismanaging Project Managers

Most organizations hold project managers accountable for project performance. But they don't grant those project managers control of needed resources. Nor do they hold project sponsors or other senior managers accountable for the consequences of their actions when they interfere with project work. Here's a catalog of behaviors worth looking at. Available here and by RSS on May 21.

Coaching services

I offer email and telephone coaching at both corporate and individual rates. Contact Rick for details at rbrenDJpmhgyaDTwBQXkhner@ChacmGoYuzfZpOvDQdRkoCanyon.com or (650) 787-6475, or toll-free in the continental US at (866) 378-5470.

Get the ebook!

Past issues of Point Lookout are available in six ebooks:

• Get 2001-2 in Geese Don't Land on Twigs (PDF, )
• Get 2003-4 in Why Dogs Wag (PDF, )
• Get 2005-6 in Loopy Things We Do (PDF, )
• Get 2007-8 in Things We Believe That Maybe Aren't So True (PDF, )
• Get 2009-10 in The Questions Not Asked (PDF, )
• Get all of the first twelve years (2001-2012) in The Collected Issues of Point Lookout (PDF, )

Are you a writer, editor or publisher on deadline? Are you looking for an article that will get people talking and get compliments flying your way? You can have 500-1000 words in your inbox in one hour. License any article from this Web site. More info