The hot hand fallacy is the belief that we can better estimate the outcome of tests of skill if we weigh recent results more heavily than less recent results. It was first identified by Gilovich, Vallone, and Tversky in 1985. [Gilovich 1985] They found that the belief that basketball players can have "hot hands," leading to streaks of successful shooting, is without statistical foundation. That is, players do have "hot streaks" and "cold streaks," but the streaks that do happen are consistent with random chance.
Nevertheless, people do believe in the "hot hand," in basketball, and at work.
When someone has succeeded at a string of assignments, managers and executives tend to attribute that success, without proof, to the performer's innate capabilities. And the longer the string of successes, the more faith they have in the belief, even though every string of successes has a beginning, before which outcomes were less stellar.
When we believe someone has a "hot hand," we tend to ensure that he or she is fully occupied. Then, when a difficult challenge with a troubled history comes along, we sometimes try to fit it into whatever the hot-handed people are already doing. We add it to their responsibilities, hoping for yet another success. If it doesn't fit well, we make it fit. Voila! Scope creep.
But there's a little more to it. The people whom we regard as having a "hot hand" often regard themselves that way, too. They overestimate their capabilities, partly because of the hot hand fallacy, and perhaps partly due to another cognitive bias called the illusion of control. The illusion of control is our tendency to overestimate our ability to control events that are beyond our control.
For example, a project manager who completes a project successfully might not notice that she was able to retain all of her staff for the life of the project — no key people were suddenly reassigned to other projects. Scope creep often takes place
outside our awareness, due to
misjudgments arising from
cognitive biasesIn many organizations, such a record is rare. But a project manager exulting in success might not notice this fortunate turn of events. Most project managers cannot control these "staff raids," but when they don't happen, the project runs more smoothly. Project managers then might tend to attribute the project's success to their own performance, neglecting to attribute any of it to good fortune. Project managers, or any managers, who attribute successes to their own performance, ignoring good fortune, might be in the grip of the illusion of control. And someone in that state is more likely to accept additional responsibilities when they're offered. Voila! Scope creep.
This example suggests that two people under the influence of different cognitive biases might produce collaborative misjudgments more erroneous than either of them acting independently, if their respective cognitive biases interoperate synergistically. Fascinating. First in this series Next in this series Top Next Issue
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More articles on Project Management:
- Seeing Through the Fog
- When projects founder, we're often shocked — we thought everything was moving along smoothly.
Sometimes, with the benefit of hindsight, we can see that we had — or could have had — enough
information to determine that trouble was ahead. Somehow it was obscured by fog. How can we get better
at seeing through the fog?
- Managing Non-Content Risks: II
- When we manage risk, we usually focus on those risks most closely associated with the tasks at hand
— content risks. But there are other risks, to which we pay less attention. Many of these are
outside our awareness. Here's Part II of an exploration of these non-content risks, emphasizing those
that relate to organizational politics.
- Down in the Weeds: I
- When someone says, "I think we're down in the weeds," a common meaning is that we're focusing
on inappropriate — and possibly irrelevant — details. How does this happen and what can
we do about it?
- The Planning Dysfunction Cycle
- Some organizations consistently choose not to allocate enough resources or time to planning for their
most complex undertakings. Again and again, they decline to plan carefully enough despite the evidence
of multiple disappointments and chaotic performance. Resource contention and cognitive biases conspire
to sustain this cycle of dysfunction.
- Seven Planning Pitfalls: III
- We usually attribute departures from plan to poor execution, or to "poor planning." But one
cause of plan ineffectiveness is the way we think when we set about devising plans. Three cognitive
biases that can play roles are the so-called Magical Number 7, the Ambiguity Effect, and the Planning Fallacy.
Forthcoming issues of Point Lookout
- Coming February 8: Kerfuffles That Seem Like Something More
- Much of what we regard as political conflict is a series of squabbles commonly called kerfuffles. They captivate us while they're underway, but after a month or two they're forgotten. Why do they happen? Why do they persist? Available here and by RSS on February 8.
- And on February 15: Four Razors for Organizational Behavior
- Deviant organizational behavior can harm the people and the organization. In choosing responses, we consider what drives the perpetrators. Considering Malice, Incompetence, Ignorance, and Greed, we can devise four guidelines for making these choices. Available here and by RSS on February 15.
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